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Abstract
The paper investigates, from the welfare and growth point of view, the de-
termination of the optimal capacity of the banking system. For that purpose,
we consider an overlapping generation model with endogenous growth. There
is horizontal diﬀerentiation and imperfect competition in the banking sector.
Macroeconomic shocks aﬀect the return on capital and, together with the ex-
pectations of depositors, condition the stability of the banking sector. We specify
to what extent deposit insurance may reduce instability and increase the num-
ber of deposits, welfare and growth. We also characterize the conditions under
which excess banking capacities may appear and how their reduction may im-
prove welfare.
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Re´sume´
Cet article e´tudie la de´termination des capacite´s optimales du secteur ban-
caire du point de vue de la croissance et du bien-eˆtre. Nous conside´rons un
mode`le a` ge´ne´rations imbrique´es avec croissance endoge`ne. Le secteur bancaire
est caracte´rise´ par une diﬀe´rentiation horizontale et de la concurrence impar-
faite. Des chocs macroe´conomiques alte`rent le rendement du capital et peuvent
porter atteinte a` la stabilite´ du secteur bancaire, de meˆme que les anticipa-
tions des de´posants. Nous spe´cifions comment l’assurance sur les de´poˆts peut
re´duire l’instabilite´ et augmenter le nombre de de´posants, le bien-eˆtre et la crois-
sance. Nous pre´cisons aussi les conditions sous lesquelles des capacite´s bancaires
exce´dentaires peuvent apparaˆıtre et comment leur re´duction peut accroˆıtre le
bien-eˆtre e´conomique.
Classification JEL : 016, G21
Mots-Cle´s: Assurance sur les de´poˆts, concurrence imparfaite, Croissance,
Banques.
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1. Introduction
Over the last 15 years, in a context of increasingly global and deregulated markets,
banking sectors in a number of countries around the world have experienced a signifi-
cant increase in the number of branches. In many cases, this movement has led to the
emergence of excess capacity (See Frydl,1993, for the US and Davis and Salo,1998,
for the European Union). Although the concept of banking capacity is diﬃcult to
define, one of its most worrisome consequences is the growing instability of the bank-
ing sector. Excess capacity is usually associated with low profitability and therefore
increasing risk of failures. It is clear, in particular, that many of the recent banking
crises, like the US Savings and Loans debacle, the Scandinavian banking crisis in the
early 1990s and in the Japanese banking system have been associated with some sort
of excess capacity (see also Allen and Gale, 1999). In that case, the end of the crisis
often required some restructuring of the banking sector through the closure of unprof-
itable and risky institutions. Such a “boom-bust cycle” has direct consequences for
the growth of the economy.
There are two ways to circumvent the problem of instability. First, a safety net,
in the form of deposit insurance, may be introduced in order to reduce the risk of
failures. However the potentially huge cost of deposit insurance in the face of systemic
risk can exceed its benefit. Public expenditure to meet deposit insurance claims and
recapitalize banks have been sizeable, amounting to nearly 3% of annual GDP in the
US and Norway, 5 to 7% Sweden and Finland, and the ultimate cost to taxpayers is
also expected to be large in Japan. Deposit insurance should not be implemented at
all costs and it is one of the aims of the paper to measure the overall eﬀect of deposit
insurance on welfare and on economic growth.
Second, given the existence of externalities across banking networks, the full dereg-
ulation of banking markets may be one source of accumulation of excess capacities.
As a consequence, in the countries that liberalised their banking sector, the shift away
from regulation has never been fully complete, as indicated by the continuous reliance
on prudential supervision based on licensing and ownership control, as well as risk
management requirements. However, the authorities in charge of banking supervision
have never received clear guidelines. The second aim of the paper is therefore to inves-
tigate under which circumstances it might be eﬃcient, in order to maximise welfare
and growth, to avoid that too many firms enter the market, or to facilitate the exit
of banks from the market. A related question is how far one should promote bank
mergers.
It is often argued that the risk of instability in the banking sector is only transitory
in the case of a “regime shift” in the regulatory environment, which may trigger price-
wars or lending mania, if one is willing to accept some myopia on the part of banks.
But Canadian history oﬀers an illustrative example where an oligopolistic banking
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system turned out to be more eﬃcient (or less ineﬃcient) than the U.S. system with
respect to stability and consumers’ welfare in the long run. During the period 1925-
1980, interest rates paid on deposits were higher in Canada than in the US, and
interest rates charged on loans were quite similar in the two countries (Bordo, Rockoﬀ
and Redish [1994]). No bank failure has been registered in Canada since 1924. By
contrast, over 9000 failures of mostly small banks occurred in the US between 1930 and
1933. Although banks also benefitted from the absence of unit-banking regulation and
the smaller size of the banking system allowed them to organise an implicit deposit
insurance system, the main factor explaining the greater stability of the Canadian
banking system is, according to Bordo, Rockoﬀ and Redish [1996], that the Canadian
federal government favored mergers and banking concentration during the period 1900-
1925. Mergers are a substitute to bankruptcy which limits bankruptcy costs during
times of financial distress. They also increase margins and lower the probability of
bankruptcy for the subsequent periods. They helped banks to achieve their eﬃciency
level as well as regional diversification and therefore to increase depositors’ welfare.
Hence, restrictions to entry may have improved welfare and achieved stability even
in the absence of deposit insurance, as it was the case in Canada up to 1966 (Carr,
Mathewson and Quickley [1995]). One should acknowledge, however, that both the
U.S. and the Canadian banking systems where aﬀected by two diﬀerent ineﬃcient
regulations from 1925 to 1980 (namely deposit insurance and entry regulation), so
that the Canadian experience may have not been so eﬃcient in absolute terms. What
is more, the U.S. banking system dramatically changed since 1980 (Berger, Kashyap
and Scalise [1995]), and the Canadian banking system experienced severe diﬃculties
at the same time.
The trade-oﬀ between competitive eﬃciency and stability of the banking sector
has an impact not only on the cyclical behaviour, but also on the long run growth
of an economy. Large (and possibly low frequency) macro-economic shocks may lead
to a breakdown of the financial system, which aﬀects the average growth rate over
a decade or more. As detailed by Friedman and Schwartz [1963] and Bordo et al.
[1996], the distrust of depositors and the recurrent bank runs over the period 1850-
1925 in Canada and during the 1930s in the US may have had a long run negative
impact on the eﬃciency of the collection of savings as households attempted to convert
deposit into currency.1 As financial autarky generally implies a less eﬃcient allocation
of savings than intermediated savings, the lack of depositors’ confidence due to the
threat of a failure of the banking system may be detrimental to long run economic
growth. Over the period starting from the last bank failure in Canada till the eve of
World War II (1925-1938), the average annual growth of GDP per head in Canada was
more than half a percentage point higher than the growth rate in the United States,
where a breakdown of the financial system happened during the Great Depression.2
1This distrust of banks can be measured by the ratio of cash/deposits which exhibit a negative
correlation with growth rates (Friedman and Schwartz [1963]).
2Authors’ calculations based on data from Maddison [1995], p.206-209.
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Nowadays, in several less developed countries, depositors’ lack of confidence in the
financial system is an acute problem which inhibits the collection of savings and may
contribute to the persistence of poverty traps (Fry [1995]). The present paper tackles
this general issue on the ground that the overall social cost of banks failures are higher
than the costs of failures in other industries. This is due to the existence of negative
externalities among banks and companies, leading to systemic risk.3
Section 2 presents a sketch of the model and of its core assumptions. Section 3 of
the article describes the behaviour of firms, households and financial intermediaries,
including the equilibrium with free entry. Section 4 analyses the possible growth
paths. Section 5 considers the impact of deposit insurance on welfare. The eﬀects
of reducing excess capacities in the banking system is assessed in section 6. A last
section concludes briefly the paper.
2. The model
2.1. A Sketch of the Model and Its Results
This model includes five market imperfections. It is necessary to emphasize which
kind of results are driven by each of them and by their interaction.
First of all, we assume that there is imperfect competition with horizontal diﬀer-
entiation on the deposit market as in Salop’s [1979] model.4 Such a model allows to
assess easily the impact on banking markets of shifts in depositors’ confidence. House-
holds choose between deposits or an alternative “storage technology”, so that distrust
in the banking system aﬀects the ratio between deposit and the storage technology, in
a similar way as the fluctuations in the deposit/currency ratio analyzed by Friedman
and Schwartz [1965].5
The second core assumption of our model is the introduction of bankruptcy costs for
each operating bank. As soon as there are deadweight losses from bankruptcy costs,
the expected welfare of the economy is aﬀected, which is not the case with perfect
financial markets. As we intend to study the financing of deposit insurance and the
management of systemic risk, we consider that all banks are identically aﬀected by a
macro-economic shock, which may generate a sizeable bankruptcy cost in the overall
3Loss rates defined as the ratio of total losses ultimately experienced by depositors of the failing
banks in a given year to total deposits during that year were higher than 40% in Canada for 4
out of 65 years between 1880 and 1925 (Bordo et al.[1996]). According to Gendreau and Prince
[1986], direct costs of bankruptcy in large US banks during the 1929-1933 period amounted to 6%
of liabilities and where higher than the costs of bankruptcy of non-financial firms. Regarding the
issue of indirect failure costs, Rajan [1996] gives a measure of the value of relationships: in 1984,
client firms of Continental Illinois Bank incurred average abnormal stock returns of -4.2% during the
bank’s impending insolvency. See also Berger, Kashyap and Scalise’s [1995] calculations.
4Horizontal diﬀerentiation among banks on the deposit market is related to the fact that banks
diﬀer in terms of location, range of services oﬀered and pattern of relationships with customers.
5This storage technology could be modelled as currency, with its supply growing exogenously, as
in Williamson [1987].
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banking sector, and therefore may present a large negative eﬀect on expected aggregate
welfare, even when the bankruptcy probability is low.
On the basis of these two distortions alone, namely imperfect competition in bank-
ing together with the assumption of bankruptcy costs for banks, a trade-oﬀmay appear
between competition and stability. Increasing competition has two opposing eﬀects.
On the one hand, it increases the posted return on deposits through the elimination
of the usual deadweight loss associated to imperfect competition (see e.g. Berger and
Hannan [1998]). On the other hand, it decreases banks’ expected profits, partly be-
cause it increases the probability of bankruptcy in the face of a macro-economic shock
and thus lowers expected return for depositors who bear the deadweight loss related
to bankruptcy costs. To exhibit this trade-oﬀ, it is therefore not necessary to consider
shifts in the risk-diversified portfolio of banks. It is well known that in this latter
case too, increasing competition may give incentives to bankers toward excessive risk-
taking through portfolio changes in an eﬀort to maintain the level of expected profits
obtained in the presence of lower competition (Keeley [1990], Chan et al.[1992]). But
we stress here that the assumption of the excessive risk taking within risk-diversified
portfolios is not indispensable in order to have a stability/competition trade-oﬀ.6
Third, we introduce asymmetric information between depositors and banks, in line
with the recent economic literature on bank runs which focused naturally on the
role of depositors expectations and of asymmetric information theories of financial
intermediation. Following Diamond [1984], we abstract from limited liability issues.7
Incentives to banks are provided by the existence of nonpecuniary penalties, so that
the free put option of deposit insurance does not generate perverse incentives to go
bankrupt. As mentioned before, depositors bear the cost of bankruptcy. We consider
a Bayesian rational expectation equilibria to model depositors expectations about
failure probabilities, as in Matutes and Vives’ [1996] duopoly model. The presence
of scale economies in the banking sector, due to the existence of a minimum size
investment, leads to the possible occurence of a banking crisis equilibrium, related to
a coordination failure between depositors expectations, like a sunspot (Matutes and
Vives [1996]). In the other equilibria, the probability of default is endogenous and
depends on fundamentals due to the rational expectation assumption.8
6We do not focus on the countervailing incentive of the bank charter value put forward in e.g.
Bhattacharya et al. [1998]. In a dynamic setting, the present value of expected future rents represent
the bank’s charter value. If the deposit insurer threatens to close the bank whenever it fails, then a
high bank charter value can deter risk taking. The higher the bank charter value (the higher the bank
market power), the higher the cost associated with losing it (Marcus [1984], Keeley [1990], Suarez
[1998]). But, as put forward by Bhattacharya et al.’s [1998] survey, “most of the models are partial
equilibrium and do not completely endogenize bank rents”, by contrast with this paper.
7Analysis of the choice of asset risk and the moral hazard problem associated with excessive risk
taking under limited liability can be found in Genotte and Pyle [1990], John, John and Senbet [1991],
Besanko and Thakor [1992] and Matutes and Vives [2000].
8Besanko and Thakor [1992] study the eﬀects of barriers to entry in the banking sector in a partial
equilibrium model. An innovation of our model is to endogeneise the probability of bank failures,
whereas this is an exogenous parameter in their model.
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Fourth, we consider a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and
production (Diamond [1965]). Overlapping generations models include a market im-
perfection as dead generations cannot trade with the generations following their death.
However, the current literature on deposit insurance stresses even more restrictive par-
tial equilibrium models. These models cannot evaluate the costs and the availibility of
funds necessary to finance deposit insurance. Funds are most of the time considered
to be unlimited and available at zero costs. In our model, government provides funds
through intergenerational transfers. The availability of funds for deposit insurance is
thus endogenous in our setting.
Finally, we consider the possibility of an endogenous growth mechanism based on
external increasing returns to scale as in Romer [1986]. The reason why we introduced
this market distortion is that we note that stability problems of the banking sector
may have severe long-term consequences by lowering the average growth rate of the
economy. The production externality in the production sector is somehow related to
coordination issues. Its eﬀect in our model is to amplify the consequences of the other
capital market imperfections through a long run growth rate eﬀect. We also provide
the results without the assumption of external increasing return to scale. Then, one
obtains the standard eﬀect on the transitory growth rate of Diamond’s [1965] model
without production externality but with an exogenous long run growth rate.
These market imperfections call for policy measures related to prudential super-
vision. We compare here restrictions on competition, and in particular on entry, for
instance of foreign banks or out of state banks in the US (Mishkin [2000]),9 to the
existence of a deposit insurance scheme when there is free entry in the banking sector.
We assess the impact of these two policy measures in terms of feasibility and welfare
enhancing properties.
The benchmark case of free entry in the banking industry represents the most com-
petitive outcome in the context of imperfect competition (monopolistic competition).10
Banking structure is in this case endogenous, the equilibrium number of banks being
the consequence of the existence of a fixed cost in the banking activity, which is akin to
assuming increasing returns in financial intermediation (see e.g. Besanko and Thakor
[1992a]).11
Comparing the two prudential policies leads to the three following results. First,
deposit insurance eliminates default and therefore it is able to eliminate confidence
crises related to the problem of coordination on expectations. It is not the case for
the restriction to entry, where default remains a possibility. But, second, deposit
insurance cannot always be financed by intergenerational tranfer, when the standard
error on the macro-economic risk exceeds a threshold that we determine (in terms of
9Or by imposing ceilings on interest rate charged on deposits.
10Free entry is usually related to a long run equilibrium, which is compatible with studying long-run
growth, as we do in this model.
11The fixed intermediation cost plays also a role in the existence of coordination failures of depos-
itors expectations.
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mean-preserving spread). Conversely, restrictions to entry can always be implemented.
When there is no confidence crisis, however, one can compare welfare between the
two policies. On the deposit insurance side, we show that organizing an ex post
intergenerational transfer from young workers to old savers, i.e. only once a bad shock
hits the economy, is better for saving, growth and welfare than attracting a large
amount of liquid funds ex ante from young workers to insure them, as it diverts too
much savings from productive activities.12 Concerning restrictions to entry, we show
that they improve welfare only under a particular condition. This is the case when
a slight change of interest rate implies a rather large change in the probability of
bankruptcy, i.e. when the distribution of the macro-economic risk is concentrated in
the neighborhood of the free entry interest rate. However, in a context where deposit
insurance can be implemented while free entry does not maximize welfare, we show
that the introduction of deposit insurance with free entry can provide a higher welfare.
The overall conclusion is rather at the advantage of deposit insurance with free entry
with respect to entry restrictions. But, when deposit insurance with free entry cannot
be financed, there remains a possibility that restricting entry may improve welfare in
some cases.
We now present the model in fuller details.
2.2. Firms
The technology exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to capital kt and
labour N and the production function has a Cobb-Douglas specification. Capital
entirely depreciates in one period. Population N is constant over time. We have
yt = utatk
α
t N
1−α, where ut represents a macro-economic shock aﬀecting technology,
which cannot be diversified. It is identically and independently distributed on
·
u
−
, u
¸
from period to period, with an expectation equal to unity (Et−1 [ut] = 1).
Aggregate output is denoted Yt. This simple specification of the technology can be
understood as a reduced form of more complex endogenous growth models. Firms are
price takers on the final good market. At date t− 1, entrepreneurs choose capital and
labour for production at date t by maximizing expected profits, taking into account
the expectation of the macroeconomic shock ut that will hit the economy next period:
(N∗, k∗t ) ∈ ArgMaxEt−1
h
utatk
α
t N
1−α − wtN −Rtkt
i
(2.1)
Wage earners’ expected income is Et−1 [wt], and the expected return on capital
is Et−1 [Rt]. labour market is perfectly competitive. Ex ante factor demands are
functions of marginal productivities:
Et−1[Rt] = atαk
α−1
t N
1−α (2.2)
12For example, Qi [1994, p.406] only considered as a possibility for the government to sponsor
a lender of last resort financed by attracting ex ante liquid funds of depositors in his overlapping
generation model version of the Diamond and Dybvig’s [1983] model.
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Et−1 [wt] = at(1− α)kαt N−α (2.3)
Once the shock is realised, wage and the return on capital are determined by
realised marginal productivities:
Rt = utatαk
α−1
t N
1−α (2.4)
wt = utat(1− α)kαt N−α =
1− α
α
Rt
kt
N
(2.5)
We provide results for this production function and also we consider the partic-
ular case of endogenous growth, when the productivity term a introduces a positive
externality, depending on aggregate private capital Kt as in Romer [1986], so that
at = AK
1−α
t .
2.3. Households’ behaviour
A simple model of overlapping generations is considered. The population of each
generation is of fixed size and lives for two periods. The welfare of future generations
is not taken into account in the agent’s utility function. The population is a continuum
of mass N spread on a circle of length 1 in order to formalize spatial diﬀerentiation. In
the first period, each agent oﬀers one unit of labour and saves a fraction of her income.
The utility function depends on each period’s consumption in a linear fashion, so that
households are risk neutral.13 Households have no direct access to financial markets,
and they cannot set up a business by themselves. They decide upon the amount of
savings St and its allocation between a riskless asset (1 − bt) and a risky asset (bt),
taking into account the expected net return of each asset.
(St, bt) ∈ Argmax (wt − St) +
Et[bt · (RIFt+1 − δ · l) + (1− bt) · v]St
1 + ρ
(2.6)
w is the real wage, ρ is the subjective rate of time preference, v is the riskless asset’s
return, RIFt+1 is the random return of a deposit with a financial intermediary. In order
to make such a deposit, agents face a ’transport’ cost which is expressed as a linear
function of the distance l between the financial intermediary and the agent, with a
fixed distance coeﬃcient δ. This hypothesis represents the eﬀects of horizontal diﬀer-
entiation between financial intermediaries. Various interpretations of this eﬀect can be
given. There is an opportunity cost of time spent to go to the bank. More fundamen-
tally, financial intermediaries diﬀerentiate themselves by the nature of services oﬀered
to depositors, such as the size of their automated teller machines (ATM) networks,
the possibilities for consumption credit, the quality of service, etc. Diﬀerentiation is
taken here as given. The horizontal diﬀerentiation representation is similar to that in
Salop [1979]: n financial intermediaries are located at a distance 1/n of each other
13A mimimum consumption level constraint can be included.
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on the circle where households are uniformly distributed. Given the utility function
specified above, an agent will save all her income if the expected return on savings is
larger than the rate of time preference, i.e. if max
h
v, Et
³
RIFt+1
´
− δ · l
i
> 1 + ρ; this
condition is assumed to hold. The individual propensity to save does not depend on
the interest rate (St = wt).
We proceed in two steps. First, in the following subsection, we determine equilibria
for a given number of banks. In subsection 2.4., we allow for free entry to pin down
the number of banks.
2.4. Oligopolistic Banking Equilibria without Entry
The equilibrium sequence follows broadly the one applied by Matutes and Vives [1996,
p.189] in their duopoly model with horizontal diﬀerentiation, which they also described
as the perfect Bayesian equilibria of a game with Bayesian depositors having point
prior beliefs. At date t, depositors are endowed with ex ante identical and prior beliefs
about the probability to have the principal and interests on deposits actually being
paid back by any bank. This identical probability of success for banks is denoted pt.
It describes an instantaneous and perfect correlation between banks failures as well
as between depositors expectations, which may happen during depositors panics. We
retained the assumption of symmetrical beliefs as we intend to stress the confidence
in the intermediation sector as a whole. This model of systemic risk is not an explicit
model of bank contagion, but, rather, a model of bank failures driven by systematic
shocks.
We describe, first, the relationships between banks and companies, then, between
banks and depositors.
We assume that banks can invest in productive projects, without asymmetric
information.14 Macroeconomic risk cannot be diversified away, and is entirely borne
by banks, which are the only suppliers of capital. Therefore, Rt+1 is the random return
at t+ 1 per unit of capital invested by a bank. In addition each bank i faces at t+ 1
a fixed cost of intermediation Ct+1.
We assume that households cannot observe ex post (at t + 1) banks’ return from
lending. This hypothesis of an infinite cost of monitoring allows us to introduce
Diamond’s [1984] framework so that optimal deposit contracts are standard debt con-
tracts. Households only know the probability distribution of the ex ante return . A
bank i oﬀers an interest rate on deposits ri,t and incurs an endogenous non-pecuniary
bankruptcy cost, as in Diamond [1984].15 This bankruptcy cost corresponds to the
14As Modigliani and Miller’s theorem applies to the credit market, any kind of financial contract
contingent on ex post state realisation can be chosen, as long as the reservation level of profits of
firms or of financial intermediaries is satisfied. For simplicity, we assumed that the contract between
banks and firms specifies ex post state contingent returns. Nonetheless, an intermediary margin on
the expected return is taken ex ante by banks when supplying funds to firms.
15Formally, the optimal contract is such that the bank incurs an endogenous non-pecuniary penalty
so that it is indiﬀerent to pay back a constant deposit rate ri to depositors. If it decides to reimburse
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time spent by intermediaries in justifying the low return, the cost of finding a new
management for the bank, or it can be associated to the loss of reputation. If the
bank’s income cannot repay the debt, bankruptcy is declared. In this case, we sup-
pose that the remaining value of the bank is not paid back to depositors but lost in
bankruptcy costs borne by depositors, as in Matutes and Vives [1996]. Households
expect to lose their deposits with a probability 1 − pt, so that the ex ante expected
return on deposits is given by Et[R
IF
t+1] = ptri,t.
16 Banks are aware of households’
expectations and determine the rate of interest on deposits accordingly. Households
then decide to deposit their savings in the nearest bank, if the expected return net of
transport cost exceeds v , the return on the storage technology (pt · ri,t − δ · l ≥ v).
Financial intermediaries may collect the savings from all depositors, or from some of
them, or none at all. If a suﬃcient amount of savings has been collected by banks,
they lend to firms and pay operating costs. In equilibrium, households’ expectations
are rational, so that the probability of success is equal to the probability of positive
profits of banks. The interaction between this probability of success and the deposit
rate defines the equilibria for a given number of banks.
In the event of success, banks repay depositors in the second period and consume
the remaining surplus. In the event of failure of the banking system, depositors (who
now belong to the old generation) and banks receive no income. The younger gener-
ation also faces risky wages.
Before computing the optimal program for a banker’s decision, we specify the
demand for deposit for a given bank i. We consider here an equilibrium with an
incomplete collection of savings. Banks do not compete directly on the deposit market,
a situation we can label as “pure” local monopolies.17 Therefore, we assume that the
equilibrium number of banks (nt) is such that the distance between two banks is always
strictly larger than 2li,t , where li,t is the distance between the marginal depositor and
the nearest bank i (2li,t ≤ 1nt ). Depositors’ expectations are supposed to be such
that pt · ri,t > v, so that some households deposit in banks. The marginal lender is
indiﬀerent between putting her saving in the bank and storing it. Its distance to the
nearest bank is given by:
li,t =
pt · ri,t − v
δ
(2.7)
Deposits with bank i are then 2li,t times the amount of individual saving. Taking
account of the number of depositors N , the amount di,t deposited with bank i is equal
to:
di,t = 2Nli,twt (2.8)
at an inferior rate z, the bank will incur a penalty φ(z) = max(ri − z, 0).
16An alternative model where banks can influence depositors’ expectations with their choice of the
rate of interest on deposits is possible but would lead to complications we wish to avoid here.
17The equilibrium with touching markets is available from the authors upon request.
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Intermediated savings increase when the transport cost δ, or when the return on the
alternative asset v decreases, or when the expected return on bank deposits ptri,t rises.
The presence of non-pecuniary externalities φ implies that risk neutral banks max-
imises expected profits unconditional to success (Diamond [1984]). The intermediation
cost Ct+1 in the banking industry requires a minimum size for deposits di,t to operate.
Bank i lends to firms all their available funds in the risky projects (ki,t+1 = di,t), be-
cause their return is higher than the return on the safe asset (the storage technology).
Banks have no other mean of finance than deposits. We suppose that competition
on the credit and deposit markets is imperfect and determined in a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium with n given players (banks). On the credit side, there is no horizontal
diﬀerentiation but the elasticity of the demand for credit is the inverse of 1−α.18 On
the deposit side, there is horizontal diﬀerentiation but the elasticity of the demand for
deposit is zero. Each bank solves the following problem:
(di,t, ki,t+1) ∈ ArgmaxEt [Ri,t+1] ki,t+1 − ri,tdi,t − Ct+1 (2.9)
s.t. ki,t+1 = di,t (2.10)
di,t = 2 ·N · wt · p · ri,t − (v/p)
δ
(2.11)
Et [Ri,t+1] = α · a · kα−1t+1 ·N1−α (2.12)
This choice is made under a resource equilibrium constraint, taking into account the
deposit demand for bank i and the aggregate credit demand. One may notice that
the probability of bankruptcy will appear in the marginal condition as a factor that
raises the relative return of the riskless asset v/pt.
The best response function of a bank gives the first order condition of the above
program. As usually done, we only study symmetric equilibria, where the interest
rates are the same for all banks. We therefore omit the index i in what follows, as it
is unnecessary. They are given by:
rt =
³
1 + α−1
n
´
Et [Rt+1] +
v
pt
2
(2.13)
The rate of interest on deposits is an average of the uncertainty-corrected return on the
storage technology (v/pt) and of the credit interest rate less a mark-up depending on
the elasticity of the firms’ demand for funds (1/(α−1)) and the number of competing
18Mixing spatial diﬀerentiation and interest rate elasticity eﬀects on the credit demand in general
equilibrium leads to technical complications beyond to the scope of this paper (See Bensa¨id and De
Palma [1995, p.170] for a partial equilibrium study). Introducing Cournotian competition on the
credit side gives room for the persistence of the incomplete collection of savings by banks with free
entry, in a manner similar to Williamson [1987]. In the case of perfect competition on the credit
market, free entry of banks fills “holes”, i.e. new banks enters in areas where households do not
deposit; therefore free entry equilibria are always of the “touching markets” variety.
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banks because of Cournotian competition in the credit market. A rise in the prob-
ability of success pt, which measures households’ confidence in the banking system,
decreases the deposit rate and then increases the imperfect competition margin.
A rational expectation equilibrium imposes that households anticipate the actual
probability of success:
pt = Pr(Rt+1 · kt+1 − rt · dt − Ct+1 ≥ 0) = 1− F
Ã
rt +
Ct+1
kt+1
!
(2.14)
We define ct+1 =
Ct+1
kt+1
as the ratio of the fixed cost with respect to deposit.
For a given number of banks, one needs to specify the distribution of risk in order
to solve the system consisting of the two preceding equations. This determines the
number of “short run equilibrium” values for the probability of success and the interest
rate on deposits (p∗t , r
∗
t ). The amount of deposits collected by one bank d
∗
t and of credit
k∗t can then be computed immediately. For a given number of banks and when deposit
markets are not touching, several cases are possible: multiple equilibria, a unique
equilibrium or none, as in Matutes and Vives [1996] duopoly model. Banks perceived
as “low risk” by depositors will have, for a given interest rate, larger markets and
hence a lower probability of default, which reinforces the initial confidence. Because
of the fixed cost, a minimum size is required for any banking activity. There always
exists an equilibrium without banks, which corresponds to a poverty trap for a zero
probability of success of banks, where rational expectations are also self-fulfilling.
Increasing returns in banking reinforce the possibility of multiple equilibria. One
self-fulfilling mechanism may be characterised by the perception of a lower risk in
banking by depositors, the increase in the intermediation margin and the decrease
in the probability of bankruptcy associated with a bigger bank. But the standard
monopolistic competition “long run equilibrium” with free entry exhibits a smaller set
of equilibria as presented in the next section.
2.5. Banking Equilibrium with Free Entry
Knowing the equilibrium for a given number of banks (p∗t , r
∗
t ), we now suppose that
there is free entry in the banking sector in the long run. The number of banks, n∗∗t , is
determined by a zero profit condition. Ignoring the integer constraint, the zero profit
condition for banks allows to pin down the number of banks, as:
n∗∗t =
(1− α)Et [Rt+1]
2ct +
v
p∗∗t
− Et [Rt+1]
= n∗
Ã
Et [Rt+1]
+
, p∗∗t
+
, v
−
, ct+1
−
!
(2.15)
A decrease in marginal productivity for the final good sector and a rise in the
intermediation cost or in the relative return of the alternative asset diminish the
number of banks and aggravate imperfect competition. This new equation is to be
added to the system of the preceding section in order to solve the long run equilibrium
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with free entry (p∗∗t , r
∗∗
t , n
∗∗
t ) (the ** superscripts refer to equilibrium values with free
entry). For p ∈]0, 1]:
r∗∗t = Et [Rt+1]− ct+1 (2.16)
p∗∗t = 1− F (Et [Rt+1]) (2.17)
The zero expected profit condition (where profit is a linear function of the shock)
imposes that the probability of negative profit should be equal to the probability that
the ex post return equals its expectation. When the random variable is symmetrically
distributed, the usual free entry condition implies a rather high probability of default,
equal to 1/2. As a consequence, whatever the ex ante expectation on the default
probability pt ∈]0, 1], banks’ behaviour and the free entry condition will determine
ex post a probability of success p∗∗t . Apart from the “distrust” equilibrium (pt =
0 ⇒ p∗∗t = 0), there exists only one other long-run equilibrium, defined by the above
equations. The condition for a partial collection of deposit with respect to the full
collection over the whole circle is given by 2l∗∗t n
∗∗
t < 1 with l
∗∗
t =
p∗∗t r
∗∗
t −v
δ .
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3. Three growth regimes
Under the previous assumptions regarding the non-availability of other sources of
funding outside banks and the total depreciation of capital in one period, the capital
stock is equal to investment in that period, as well as to intermediated savings. Three
regimes are possible. A first equilibrium corresponds to the absence of banks and
therefore to the non-intermediation of savings. Investment is null and the growth
rate is zero. This defines a poverty trap. In the second type of equilibrium banks
collect deposits as local monopolies. A third equilibrium is characterized by total
intermediation of aggregate saving, which corresponds to the intermediation of all
aggregate saving and to a maximum growth rate. We normalize the population size
to unity (N = 1):
• The poverty trap
It may come from households’ distrust towards the banking sector. If agents
expect a probability of success pt = 0, the zero growth equilibrium appears
whatever the levels of expected productivity for firms and the levels of interme-
diation cost. The self-fulfilling prophecy mechanism is the following. Depositors
have an anticipation of a zero probability of success. As a consequence, nobody
will make deposits to the banks, whatever the interest rate oﬀered. The amount
of intermediated saving is null, and no bank can operate. Since intermediation
is necessary for investment, there is no growth.
19The case of full collection of savings is available from the authors upon request.
14
A second possibility of a poverty trap exists, when markets are non touching.
The condition is not so much based on expectations, but rather, on technology.
When l∗∗t ≤ 0 , the productivity factor Et[Rt+1] is not high enough to have agents
go to the bank considering the level of intermediation costs and the default risk:
Et[Rt+1] < ct+1 + (v/p
∗∗
t ). No bank is active and growth is zero.
• Local monopolies
Local monopolies obtain when 0 < 2n∗∗t l
∗∗
t < 1 and n
∗∗ > 0. This supposes that
capital productivity Et[Rt+1] is such that
v/p∗∗t + ct+1 < Et[Rt+1] < min [v/p
∗∗
t + 2ct+1, h (ct+1, v/p
∗∗
t )] .
There is complete collection of saving when l∗∗ = 1/2n∗∗, which sets a higher
bound to capital productivity Et[Rt+1] < h(ct, v/p
∗∗) so that the deposit markets
for each bank are not “touching”20. The existence of a long term equilibrium
where aggregate saving is not entirely intermediated by banks is made possible
by imperfect competition in banking activity. Without it, a bank could always
enter and take control of the market share left by other banks, until all banks are
in competition for the marginal saver (this is what happens when markets are
touching). When markets are not touching, and for a given number of bank, the
random growth factor is given by this general expression (Kt denotes aggregate
capital):
Gt =
Kt+1
Kt
=
nt2l
∗
t
L
wtN
Kt
=
nt
2(p∗t r∗t−v)
δ
L
wtN
Kt
(3.1)
wt is individual savings, wtN is aggregate savings. Financial intermediation
determines the growth rate through the number of banks n and the market
share of each bank measured by 2l∗(the latter measures intermediated savings)
relative to the overall potential deposit market measured by the length of the
circle L.
In the particular case of endogenous growth, the expected aggregate return to
capital takes into account the productive externality and is constant and the
real wage are given by :
Et[Rt+1] = αA (3.2)
wt = ut (1− α)AKt = ut
µ
1− α
α
¶
Et−1 [Rt]Kt (3.3)
20Developments related to “touching” markets are available from the authors.
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• With free entry in banking and population normalized to one, the growth factor
is now equal to:
Gt = utA(1− α) · 2[1− F (Aα)](Aα− ct+1)− v
δL
· Aα (1− α)
2ct+1 +
v
1−F (A·α) −Aα
= Gt
Ã
A
+
, δ
−
, ct+1
−
, v
−
, p∗∗
+
,α
?
!
(3.4)
The growth rate is constant. As in all “AK” endogenous growth model, it de-
pends positively on capital productivity. Imperfect competition in the banking
sector introduces three explanatory factors: population density (1/L), interme-
diation cost ratio ct and v/p
∗∗, the return on the alternative asset, augmented
by the risk of a failure of the banking system. The intermediation cost ratio is
determined by the following implicit equation:
ct+1 =
Ct+1
2l∗∗t wt
(3.5)
where l∗∗t = l
∗∗
t (ct+1) and where the intermediation cost Ct+1 is given.
It is useful to assess the relationship between welfare and growth in each of these
regimes. There are four sources of ineﬃciency in this model. First, there is the
distortion due to imperfect competition in the banking sector, which aﬀects the level of
saving and investment. Second, there is the deadweight loss of bankruptcy costs borne
by depositors. Third, there is the lack of intergenerational exchange, which appears in
overlapping generation models when the utility of finitely lived agents does not include
bequests. Fourth, there is the productive externality in the production function which
introduces a wedge between the social and private returns to investment.
A measure of welfare for a population of heterogenous agents (with respect to the
return they obtain on their savings, which depends on their location) is to sum over
the individual utilities for a representative generation.21 Households save their whole
income in the first period. The return on savings depends on the transaction cost they
incur. Noting Uat the sum of individual (expected) utilities of households born on date
t−1, dividing by the capital stock of the first period, and substituting δ · l∗ = p∗r∗−v
, one obtains the following general relationship between welfare (normalised by capital
Kt) and growth for an exogenous or endogenous number of banks:
Uat
Kt
=
1
1 + ρ
wt
Kt
2nt
(Z l∗t
0
[p∗t r
∗
t − δ · i] di+
Z 1/(2·nt)
l∗t
[v] di
)
(3.6)
=
1
(1 + ρ)
Gt
l∗t
"
p∗t r
∗
t l
∗
t − δ
(l∗t )
2
2
+ v
µ
1
2nt
− l∗t
¶#
21This measure of welfare does not resolve the overlapping generation distortion.
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=
Gt
(1 + ρ)
½
p∗t r
∗
t −
p∗t r
∗
t − v
2
+ v ·
µ
wt
GtKt
− 1
¶¾
=
1
(1 + ρ)
·µ
p∗t r
∗
t − v
2
¶
Gt + v
wt
Kt
¸
(3.7)
As welfare is a linear function of the real wages, it is a linear function of the macro-
economic shock ut. This measure of welfare does not take into account the risk of a
confidence crisis (p = 0), where savings and welfare turn to be zero, with a low but
unknown probability.
• Complete collection of saving
There is complete collection of saving when l∗∗ = 1/2n∗∗, which sets a lower bound
to capital productivity Et[Rt+1] > h(ct, v/p
∗∗). Since all saving is collected, the saving-
investment equality gives the following growth rate: Gt =
wt
Kt
. In the case of endoge-
nous growth, this growth rate is such that Gt = ut (1− α)A. Since the individual
saving behaviour does not depend on interest rates, neither does aggregate collected
saving and growth when markets are touching.22 But imperfect competition aﬀects
the returns on savings and the general expression of welfare, for an exogenous or
endogenous number of banks nt:
Uat
Kt
=
1
1 + ρ
wt
Kt
2nt
ÃZ 1/2·nt
0
[p∗t r
∗
t − δ · i] di
!
=
Gt
(1 + ρ)
2nt
Ã
p∗t r
∗
t
2nt
− δ
( 1
2nt
)2
2
!
=
Gt
(1 + ρ)
Ã
p∗t r
∗
t −
1
4
δ
nt
!
(3.8)
The relationship between welfare depends on the returns on savings whereas growth
is independent of these returns.
4. Deposit insurance
One possible way to increase welfare is to introduce deposit insurance with free entry
in order to eliminate systemic risk (a simultaneous default of all the banks represents
systemic risk in our setting). As indicated in the preceding section, there are two
types of free entry equilibria, corresponding to two types of ex-ante expectations of
depositors of the probability of default. On the one hand, a self-fulfilling confidence
crisis (possibly driven by a sunspot) is such that pt = 0⇒ p∗∗t = 0. On the other hand,
a perfect-foresight equilibrium is characterised by pt ∈]0, 1]⇒ p∗∗t = 1− F (Et [Rt+1]).
22The eﬀect on growth of a mark down of financial intermediaries on savings of a representative
household whose savings behaviour depends positively on the interest rate on deposit has already been
dealt with in several papers (see, for example, Berthe´le´my and Varoudakis [1996]). In this paper, we
stress another eﬀect. Households are heterogenous, so that intermediated savings is a function of the
number of depositors. The two eﬀects can be mixed, if one assumes that individual savings function
depends on interest rate, but our point would be less clear.
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We consider the case of deposit insurance with free entry (it is shown in the next
section that full deposit insurance with restrictions to entry is less eﬃcient). We
investigate here the case of a deposit insurance fund, which ensures that depositors
are paid back with certainty in the case of failure of the bank, whatever the size of
the losses of the banks (when Rt+1 ≤ Et [Rt+1] in the case of free entry in the banking
industry). The probability of success of banks is equal to one in that case. Diamond’s
[1984] non pecuniary penalties are maintained so that a banker has no incentive to
declare a bad state of nature to increase its personal profits, even with a safety net.
When it is necessary to avoid rapidly the risk of a breakdown of the banking sys-
tem, wage earners in the young generation have generally to contribute for old savers.
The first full deposit insurance of systemic risk scheme that we consider is as fol-
lows. The deposit insurance fund decide to tax the young generation only once the
macro-economic shock is known and if banks are facing bankruptcy to make up for
the diﬀerence between the realized value of R and the promised value of r. Taxation
implies that the fund be run by the government. The deposit insurance fund is a
“pay-as-you-go” system, designed to ensure that the “old” generation receives r with
certainty. In other words, we require premia paid to the deposit insurance fund to be
fair and no other resources to be made available to the government, which only or-
ganises the eventual transfer between generations. However, such a deposit insurance
may face a limit on the availability of funds.
Proposition 1. Feasibility of deposit insurance :
Full deposit insurance is possible only if the lower bound of the macroeconomic
return u
−
is above a threshold uIt which depends positively on the elasticity of capital
with respect to production, and negatively on the ratio of the fixed cost in banking
to expected profit flows ct
Et[Rt+1]
= Ct
Et[Rt+1]kt
. Otherwise, only an incomplete deposit
insurance scheme can be implemented, where states of nature for large negative macro-
economic shocks (such that u
−
≤ ut < uIt ) cannot be insured.
With free entry, the zero expected profit condition leads to an identical value of
the posted deposit interest rate with or without deposit insurance (rI∗t−1 = r
∗∗
t−1 =
Et−1(Rt) − ct). Still with free entry, the young generation has therefore to make up
for the diﬀerence r∗∗t−1 −Rt = Et−1 [Rt]− ct −Rt through the deposit insurance fund,
when banks are going bankrupt, i.e. for Rt < Et−1 [Rt]. Let Dt−1 = Kt be aggregate
deposits of the old. Obviously, the tax proceeds are bounded by the aggregate income
of the young generation (if Rt < Et−1 [Rt], the macro-economic shock lies between
0 <u
−
≤ ut < 1):
(Et−1 [Rt]− ct − utEt−1 [Rt]) Dt−1 ≤ wt = ut
µ
1− α
α
¶
Et−1 [Rt]Kt ⇒Ã
1− ct
Et−1 [Rt]
!
α = uIt ≤ ut ∀ut ∈ [u−, 1] (4.1)
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Full deposit insurance is possible only if the lower bound of the macroeconomic
return u
−
is not below the left hand side of the previous equation, otherwise depositors
are not insured against all the states of nature. This lower bound on the macro-
economic return is such that:
(i) it increases with the elasticity of capital with respect to output, or the share of
the return to capital in total income, which has to be insured.
(ii) it decreases with the wedge between the fixed cost and the return on savings
ct
Et[Rt+1]
= Ct
Et[Rt+1]kt
. It measures also the diﬀerence between the deposit rate and the
expected credit return. The higher it is, the lower the deposit rate and the lower the
amount of funds to be insured.
Assuming that this condition is fulfilled, we determine the growth rate and the
expected welfare in the case of deposit insurance with free entry. First, in the case
when the proportion of depositors is below unity (i. e. markets are not touching)
and with free entry, aggregate collected saving with deposit insurance provides the
expression of the growth factor with deposit insurance and free entry GIt as it is equal
to investment of the next period:
GIt =
Kt+1
Kt
=
1
Kt
2lI∗t n
I∗
t
L
n
wt −Dt−1 · 1{Rt<Et−1(Rt)} · [Et−1(Rt)− ct −Rt]
o
(4.2)
where 1{Rt<Et−1(Rt)} equals 1 when Rt < Et−1(Rt), and 0 otherwise, 2l
I∗
t is the market
share of each bank with deposit insurance and free entry and nI∗t is the number of
banks with deposit insurance and free entry. The market share of a bank is larger
with deposit insurance than without:
2lI∗t = 2
rI∗t − v
δ
= 2
r∗∗t − v
δ
≥ 2l∗∗t = 2
p∗∗t r
∗∗
t − v
δ
(4.3)
The number of banks is higher with deposit insurance than without:
nI∗t (p = 1) =
(1− α)Et(Rt+1)
2ct + v −Et(Rt+1)
≥ n∗∗t (4.4)
Proposition 2. When full deposit insurance with free entry is possible, there exists
a trade-oﬀ on the growth factor between the cost of full deposit insurance and its
benefit, so that full deposit insurance does not necessarily increases growth.
Individual income and savings may be adversely aﬀected by the deposit insurance
tax, depending on the realization of the macro shock, which slows down growth.
However, deposit insurance simultaneously increases the probability of success of banks
(since the probability of success is now equal to one with full deposit insurance). This
implies a significant increase in collected deposits by each banks (lI∗t ) and the number
of banks (nI∗t ), hence boosting growth.
Independently of the trade-oﬀ highlighted in Proposition 1, one should keep in mind
that the joint eﬀect of the rise of the probability of success leading to an increase of
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lI∗ and of nI∗ is that savings are more likely to be collected on the whole circle (the
proportion of depositors becomes unity). Since growth depends on the collection of
deposits, this is also a reason explaining why the growth rate attains its highest level
when there is full deposit insurance, although it is not necessary the case, as indicated
in Proposition 1 :
Gt =
wt
Kt
=
½
ut
µ
1− α
α
¶
Et−1(Rt)− 1{Rt<Et−1(Rt)} [(1− ut)Et−1(Rt)− ct+1]
¾
(4.5)
We then evaluate the expected aggregate welfare for a newly born generation on
date t− 1. In the case of “non touching” deposit markets, it is given by its expected
consumption at date t+ 1 :
Et−1
"
U It
Kt−1
#
=
1
1 + ρ
2nI∗
(Z lI∗
0
h
rI∗ − δ · i
i
di+
Z 1/2nI∗
l∗
v di
)
·(Et−1
·
ut
µ
1− α
α
¶
Et−1(Rt)
¸
−
Z Et−1(Rt)
u
−
Et−1(Rt)
[(1− ut)Et−1(Rt)− ct+1] dF (R))
where the first term in curly brackets is similar to (3.6) for p∗∗t = 1.
Proposition 3. There exist of trade-oﬀ on households welfare between the cost of
finance of full deposit insurance and its benefit (the increase of the expected return
on deposits) so that full deposit insurance does not necessarily increase welfare.
On the one hand, expected individual income and savings decreased due to the
expected income loss necessary to insure the savings of the old generation. On the
other hand, the expected return on the young generation’s savings increases due to
the rise of the probability of success of banks up to unity. This, in turn, implies a rise
of the number of depositors for each banks (lI∗) and a rise of the number of banks
(nI∗t ). However, if the cost of finance of deposit insurance exceed its benefits, it will
not increase welfare.
We exhibit a numerical case where welfare maximization suggests to introduce
this kind of deposit insurance (as the most usual belief is that it is ineﬃcient). We
assume endogenous growth, so that Et−1(Rt) = Aα. It is convenient to use R =
Aα(1 − m + X) where X follows a beta distribution β(a, b) on [0, 1] with a mean
m = E [X] = a/(a + b) ∈]0, 1[. In that case, u = 1 − m + X, and u
−
= 1 − m. We
check the condition for the feasibility of full deposit insurance to be fulfilled. For
simplicity, we assume that the fixed cost of a given bank is proportional to the share
of aggregate output financed by that bank such that Ct = f
Et[Yt+1]
n
, which is also a
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rather realistic assumption. In that case, the intermediation costs ratio is a constant
c = fA.23 Regarding the other parameters, we provide here an example where ρ = 0,
A = 3.7, α = 0.32, ct = 0.5, v = 0.2, δ = 0.975, a = 0.2, b = 2. Numerical
simulations show that this is an example where welfare is higher with deposit insurance
(Et−1
h
U It
i
/Kt−1 = 0.35) than without deposit insurance (U
a
t /Kt−1 = 0.19). Due to
the market share extension eﬀect, the equilibrium number of banks controls a market
share which entirely covers the circle. As the proportion of depositors is unity, the
number of banks decreases with respect to the case of free entry without deposit
insurance (nI∗ = 1.01 to be compared to n∗ = 1.43).
One could also show that such a deposit insurance scheme is preferable to another
scheme where taxes would be levied on the same generation but before the crisis arises
(i.e. when they are young) with their savings invested in the safe storage technology
with a return v.24
5. Reduction of excess capacities
We now compare restrictions to entry with respect to deposit insurance with free entry,
in this context of imperfect competition and bankruptcy costs for banks. By contrast
with full deposit insurance, restrictions to entry can always be implemented. A first
result concerns the equilibrium when the probability of success of banks is zero.
Proposition 1. Prevention of sunspot-led systemic bank run (the case for p = 0):
(i) Full deposit insurance (with or without free entry) does eliminate a sunspot-led
systemic bank run.
(ii) Restrictions to entry or an incomplete deposit insurance with free entry do not
eliminate a sunspot-led systemic bank run..
With full deposit insurance, the probability of success is one, and no sunspot led
bank run can occur. Restrictions to entry have the virtue of increasing the probability
of success of banks, but not up to one. Even in the extreme case of a monopoly in the
banking sector, this monopoly faces a non-zero probability of default related to the
existence of a macro-economic shock. With incomplete deposit insurance, some states
of nature are not insured, so that there remains a non-zero probability of default of
banks. Therefore, restrictions to entry or incomplete deposit insurance do not remove
a sunspot-led bank run.
23The welfare would be only altered at the margin by the ratio ct+1/ct stating the increase of
competition between date t and date t + 1, if the fixed intermediation cost is not indexed on a
growing factor. If it is the case, the gradual decrease of the ratio of the intermediation cost with
respect to production creates a specific dynamic which converges only in the infinite horizon to perfect
competition in the intermediation sector (Gali [1995]). On the contrary, the deposit market remains
concentrated in developped countries (except when a specific regulation inhibits concentration as in
the U.S.), so that Gali’s result is not asymptotically relevant when it is applied to the banking sector.
24The proof is available from the authors upon request.
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We can now compare the welfare changes with these two kinds of prudential poli-
cies, without taking into account the risk of a confidence crisis (p = 0). The gov-
ernment could determine the number of banks or the that maximises welfare.25 If
this number is lower than in the case of free entry, there exists excess capacities. If
not, restrictions to entry have to be prohibited. Public authorities would make an
arbitrage between stability of the banking system and competitive eﬃciency. On the
one hand, imperfect competition implies the existence of rents in banking activity. On
the other hand, these rents decrease the probability of bankruptcy and the associated
bankruptcy costs. When the proportion of depositors is below unity, we adapt the
general expression for welfare (3.7) in order to simplify the maximization:26
Uat
Kt
=
1
(1 + ρ)
·µ
pr − v
2
¶
Gt + v
wt
Kt
¸
=
1
(1 + ρ)
wt
Kt
·
(p · r − v) · n ·
µ
p · r − v
δL
¶
+ v
¸
=
1
(1 + ρ)
wt
Kt
1
δL
W (n, r, p) (5.1)
With W defined below. The number of banks that maximises the expected welfare
(for a given stock of capital at date t − 1) obtains under the constraints defining an
equilibrium for a given number of banks:
n ∈ ArgmaxW (n, r, p) = Argmax
³
n (pr − v)2 + vδL
´
(5.2)
subject to:
1 ≤ n ≤ n∗∗ < L
2
³
p∗∗r∗∗−v
δ
´ (5.3)
p (r) = 1− F (r + ct+1) (5.4)
r =
1
2
(
Et[Rt+1] ·
·
1 +
α− 1
n
¸
+
v
p
)
⇔ n(r, p) = (1− α)Et[Rt+1]
Et[Rt+1]− 2 · r + vp
(5.5)
The inequality constraints imply that (i) at least one bank exists, (ii) banks have
at least zero profit (the case for free entry is a corner solution) and (iii) in the case of
free entry, the proportion of depositors is below unity, so that the expression of welfare
is the right one. According to the last equality constraint which determines the mark
down on the posted deposit rate, n is increasing monotonically in the rate of interest
on deposits for a given probability of bankruptcy. Welfare W (n (r, p) , r, p (r)) =
H (r, p (r)) is an increasing function in both arguments (Hr > 0, Hp > 0). We can
express the first order condition as:
Hr − f(r + ct+1)Hp = 0 (5.6)
25In practical terms, government can forbid entry of foreign banks or of new banks, favour merger
policy or determine the deposit rate (Mishkin (2000)).
26The case when the proportion of depositors is unity is available from the authors upon request.
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An increase in the deposit interest rate implies an arbitrage between the rise in house-
holds’ welfare due to a higher return on saving and a reduction due to the increased
instability of the banking system measured by an increased probability of default.
Such a phenomenon is not always the rule in this model. This lead to the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. Condition for a trade-oﬀ between instability and eﬃciency:
The number of banks maximising welfare corresponds to an interest rate on deposit
r (n) such that: Hr − f(r (n) + ct+1)Hp = 0.
(i) If this interest rate is strictly beyond the deposit rate with free entry r (n) <
Et[Rt+1]− ct+1, then restrictions to entry increase welfare.
(ii) If the interest rate maximising welfare is over the deposit rate with free entry
(r (n) ≥ Et[Rt+1] − ct+1), then setting such an interest rate leads to negative profits
for banks. In this case, the corner solution with free entry maximizes welfare, because,
at this level of the deposit rate, the increase in competitive eﬃciency dominates the
decrease in expected stability (Hr > f(r + ct+1)Hp).
Excess capacities appear when small shifts of deposit rates change widely the prob-
ability of default of banks, i.e. when the distribution of risk is concentrated at the
average Et [Rt−1] = r
∗∗ + ct corresponding to the case of free entry.
For the same parameters as in the preceding section, welfare in the case of free
entry is measured by Uat /Kt = 0.19 (which corresponds to n
∗∗ = 1.43 banks). An
interior solution exists which maximises welfare (Uat /Kt = 0.51) for a lower number
of banks (n = 0.34).27 Nonetheless, the number of banks which maximises growth is
diﬀerent from the one which maximises welfare. Finally, in this particular case, welfare
with a full deposit insurance is higher than welfare with entry regulation (although a
combination of the two regulatory program is also possible).
The existence of the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and stability lead to an additional
proposition on full deposit insurance and restriction to entry:
Proposition 3. Full deposit insurance with restrictions to entry decrease welfare (ex-
cluding the sunspot equilibrium) with respect to full deposit insurance with free entry.
Without full deposit insurance, the benefit of restrictions to entry relies on the
increase of this probability of success, which decreases expected bankruptcy costs.
With full deposit insurance, the probability of success is at its maximal level (one). It
is therefore not changed by adding restrictions to entry. But the costs of restrictions
to entry, related to a higher mark-down for depositors, do aﬀect negatively welfare
with deposit insurance. Minimizing the costs of imperfect competition with deposit
insurance lead to support free entry.
In the general case, however, not only a full deposit insurance cannot always be
implemented if the lower bound on the return is too low, but also the expected cost of
27Other simulation as well as the computer program are available upon request from the authors.
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deposit insurance may exceed its expected benefit, namely the reduction of bankruptcy
costs associated with systemic risk in the banking system.
6. Conclusion
The paper shows that how a trade oﬀ between the deadweight loss associated with im-
perfect competition and the deadweight loss associated with bankruptcy costs of banks
aﬀects the eﬃciency of the financial intermediation sector, investment and growth. We
did a horse race between two kinds of public intervention in the banking activity based
on the possibility of this trade-oﬀ: deposit insurance with free entry versus restrictions
to entry. Both policies require a careful assessment of their costs and benefit on wel-
fare. It turns out that they are not always welfare maximising, even when bankruptcy
costs do exist. The balance shifts towards deposit insurance as it is able to elimi-
nate bankruptcies and therefore banking crisis related to a coordination problem of
depositors expectations. However, not only a full deposit insurance cannot always
be implemented if the lower bound on the return is too low, but also the expected
cost of deposit insurance financed by intergenerational transfers borne by the young
generation may exceed its expected benefit, the increase of the expected return on
deposits.
Further research should deal with limited liability of intermediaries and consider
the eﬀect of other forms of prudential supervision, where for example the fixed cost in
the banking activity is related to capital requirements.
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